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Abstract
Computing power continues to grow at an enormous rate. Simultaneously, more and
better data is increasingly available and Machine Learning methods have seen significant
breakthroughs in the recent past. All this pushes further the boundary of what machines
can do. Nowadays increasingly complex tasks are automatable at a precision which seemed
infeasible only few years ago. The examples range from voice and image recognition, playing
Go, to self-driving vehicles. Machines are able to perform more and more manual and also
cognitive tasks that previously only humans could do. As a result of these developments,
some argue that large shares of jobs are “at risk of automation”, spurring public fears of
massive job-losses and technological unemployment.
This chapter discusses how new digital technologies might affect the labor market in the
near future. First, the chapter discusses estimates of automation potentials, showing that
many estimates are severely upward biased because they ignore that workers in seemingly
automatable occupations already take over hard-to-automate tasks. Secondly, it highlights
that these numbers only refer to what theoretically could be automated and that this must
not be equated with job-losses or employment effects – a mistake that is done often in the
public debate. Thirdly, the chapter develops scenarios on how digitalization is likely to
affect the German labor market in the next five years and derives implications for policy
makers on how to shape the future of work. Germany is an interesting case to study, as it
is a developed country at the technological frontier. In particular, the main challenge will
not be the number, but the structure of jobs and the corresponding need for supply side
adjustments to meet the shift in demand both within and between occupations and sectors.
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1 Introduction
The past decades have been characterized by a tremendous rise of computing power. Since
1945, computing power increased, on average, by 45 percent per year, implying a drastic decline
of the costs of computational tasks (Nordhaus, 2007). These rapid improvements have been
accompanied by computer-controlled automation of so-called routine tasks. Routine tasks are
tasks which follow well-defined rules and can thus be automated based on rule-based algorithms,
using rapidly improving computers. As a consequence, labor demand for routine tasks has
generally declined. As routine tasks were wide-spread among many middle-skilled, medium-wage
workers, such as bookkeepers, clerical assistants or production workers, this computerization
has led to a polarization of the labor market in the recent past with declining shares of middle-
and rising shares of both high- and low-wage workers (see Acemoglu and Autor 2011 for a review
of the literature).
While computerization has replaced humans in many routine tasks, these tasks have in
common that they need to be well-defined. However, people understand many tasks tacitly,
without being able to clearly pin down the exact underlying rules, limiting the scope of what can
be automated based on software algorithms (“Polany’s Paradox”, Autor 2015). More recently,
these technological barriers are reduced by Machine Learning (ML) methods, in particular by
Deep Learning. Such methods are based on the idea of training machines in performing tasks
by providing them with suitable data, instead of developing algorithms of well-defined rules.
The machines “learn” how to do the task by mimicking the observed behavior, which implies
that there is no more need for explicitly understanding the precise rules underlying the observed
patterns.
Deep Learning has been advocated already decades ago under different names. It has been
discussed as cybernetics in the 1940s-1960s, as connectionism in the 1980s-1990s, and as Deep
Learning since about 2006 (Goodfellow et al., 2016). However, it has increasingly been applied
in real-world settings only recently (see Brynjolfsson et al. 2019 for examples). This is due to the
fact that these methods require both high computing power and large amounts of training data,
both of which became increasingly available during the last years. Moreover, data collection
and availability has become ubiquitous e.g. via smartphones or the internet. Therefore, the
range of problems that can be solved via ML has extended significantly. This now allows for the
automation of cognitive tasks that previously only humans could do, sometimes even exceeding
human precision (Brynjolfsson et al., 2019). These include also tasks typically requiring high-
skilled workers, see e.g. Brynjolfsson and McAffee (2016) or Pratt (2015).
Against this background, there exists a debate on how many tasks or occupations might be
automatable in the near future. A corresponding study which received widespread attention in
the public debate is Frey and Osborne (2017), who claim that about half of the US workforce
are “at risk of automation” in the next one to two decades. While some authors and consultancy
agencies make similar claims (e.g. Bowles, 2014, Pajarinen and Rouvinen, 2014, PWC, 2018),
other authors report much lower figures (Arntz et al., 2016, Arntz et al., 2017, Nedelkoska and
Quintini, 2018, Dengler and Matthes, 2018, Pouliakas, 2018).
This debate is accompanied by widespread public fears of technological unemployment.
Historically, such fears are not new. In fact, it has been claimed many times in history that
technological change will lead to mass unemployment (see Mokyr et al., 2015 for a discussion)
or will even herald the “End of Work”, as for example popularized by the eponymous book by
Rifkin (1995). So far, these fears have not come true, raising the question of why there still are
so many jobs (Autor, 2015).
In order to shed light on this question, this chapter discusses recent evidence on automation
potentials and how this might translate into actual employment effects, see also Figure 1. The
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chapter starts out by discussing how many and which kind of jobs might be automatable in
the near future (Section 2). The focus lies on explaining the large differences in corresponding
estimates. Secondly, Section 3 debates what this might imply for employment. The latter is
important, as automation potentials only capture technological feasibility to automate jobs,
which must not be equated with actual employment effects, since the diffusion of new technolo-
gies in the labor market is a slow and incomplete process (Section 3.1), workers adapt (Section
3.2) and potential job destruction effects might be compensated by job creation effects (Section
3.3). This distinction between automation potentials and actually resulti g employment effects
is often ignored in the pub ic debate. As large automatio potentials already existed in the past
withou resulting in mass unemployment, the chapter will also look b ck in time to see w y
this hasn’t been the c se and what one can learn from the past for the future of work. Thirdly,
based on new and unique data on t e use of digital technologies in the German economy, Section
4 presents first estimates of how automation via digitalization might affect the Ger an labor
market in the next few years. Section 5 concludes.
2 Automation Potentials
How many and which jobs are susceptible to future utomation? In order to address this
question, Frey and Osborne (2017) use the following approach: They ask experts in ML what
machines are able to do and extrapolate their assessments to the U.S. workforce. At first,
they subjectively hand-label 70 occupations from the O*NET database in a joint workshop
with ML experts as either automatable or non-automatable. The O*NET database provides
the task and job descriptions for each occupation. The question to be answered during the
workshop was: “Can the tasks of this job be sufficiently specified, conditional on the availability
of big data, to be performed by state of the art computer-controlled equipment” (Frey and
Osborne, 2017, p. 263). Using this approach, the authors ultimately calculate the technical
possibility of automating a job, which we refer to as automation potential. Note that the
automation potential does not capture the probability that a job is actually automated, let
alone the resulting employment effects of automation.
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Frey and Osborne (2017) then rely on a selective list of variables regarding occupational
tasks from the O*NET as well as the hand-labelled occupations from the workshop, to train
an ML algorithm that classifies occupations as automatable or non-automatable. In other
words, they estimate a statistical model of automation potentials using nine tasks indicators as
explanatory variables. Finally, they use this model to extrapolate automation potentials for all
702 occupations that are included in the O*NET task data. The model returns an estimate of
the automation potential. This number ranges between 0 and 100%. It is the likelihood that an
occupation is technically automatable or, strictly speaking, it is an estimate of the probability
that the experts would have classified a given occupation as automatable during the workshop.
Frey and Osborne (2017) then define an occupation as automatable or as “at high risk”, if
the ML algorithm returns at least an estimated automation potential of 70%. Finally, they
combine this with occupational employment data to compute that 47% of workers in the U.S.
are currently working in “high risk” or automatable occupations.
Several authors apply this approach to other countries by assigning the estimated automation
potential for an occupation from Frey and Osborne (2017) to the country-specific occupational
structure. Thereby, these studies assume that occupations are comparable across countries
regarding their task structure. For example, Bowles (2014) finds that, on average, 54% of
workers in the European Union are “at high risk”, with estimates ranging from 47% in Sweden
to 62% in Romania. Pajarinen and Rouvinen (2014) argue that 36% of workers in Finland are
automatable.
A key drawback of the approach by Frey and Osborne (2017) is that they focus on the
occupational level, thus assuming all workers of the same occupation to conduct exactly the
same tasks as described in the O*NET data. This is a very strong assumption as tasks do not
only vary between workers of different occupations, but also vary substantially between workers
of the same occupation (Autor and Handel, 2013). Moreover, the overwhelming majority of
the decline in routine tasks in the context of computerization has been due to declining shares
of routine tasks within occupations instead of declining shares of routine occupations (Spitz-
Oener, 2006). Hence, to the extent that average occupational task structures do not sufficiently
represent the task heterogeneity within occupations, especially regarding new, less automatable
tasks, occupation-level approaches, such as Frey and Osborne (2017), are likely to overestimate
automation potentials.
For this reason, Arntz et al. (2016, 2017) instead follow a different approach by focusing
on what people actually do in their jobs rather than relying on occupational descriptions of
jobs. For this, they use individual-level survey data provided by PIAAC (Programme for the
International Assessment of Adult Competencies). Based on a statistical model that links the
estimated automation potential by Frey and Osborne (2017) to the job-level characteristics of
the workers in the PIAAC, they then show that only 9% of all U.S. workers are conducting
automatable jobs (i.e. jobs with an estimated automation potential of at least 70%). Moreover,
they calculate similar figures for other countries for which the survey is available and find that
automation potentials vary between 6% in South Korea and 12% in Germany (see Figure 2).
Further differentiating the results by educational attainment, they find that low-skilled work-
ers are particularly exposed to automation (Arntz et al., 2016). The share of workers with high
automation potentials is highest for unskilled workers and strongly declines with educational
attainment (see Figure 3). Similarly, low-income workers are exposed the most, whereas high-
wage earners are least exposed to being potentially automatable. Hence, even though new
automation technologies are increasingly capable to perform tasks of highly skilled and highly
paid workers, it’s the low-skilled workers whose tasks are most exposed to being potentially au-
tomatable. This resembles the skill-biased technological change before the 1980s which favored
higher skilled workers at the expense of lower skilled workers (Acemoglu and Autor 2011) rather
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than the period from the mid-1980s until the 2000s during which computer-based technologies
mostly substituted for middle-skilled routine-task-intensive workers.
Why do they find, on average, lower estimates compared to those of Frey and Osborne
(2017)? The differences could stem either from the different level of analysis (occupation-
vs. job-level), or from differences in data and methodology. In order to test the different
explanations, Arntz et al. (2017) use occupation-level median task structures from the PIAAC
to predict the automation potentials based on their estimated model. In this case, 38% of all
U.S. workers fall in the “high-risk” group, implying that data and methodology can only explain
a small part of the differences between the occupation-level and job-level approach (see Figure
4). Instead, much of the difference is explained by the huge variation of workers’ tasks within
occupations. Apparently, workers in seemingly automatable occupations specialize in different
types of hard-to-automate tasks such that occupational means do not represent the relevant
task spectrum very well. As a result, occupation-level approaches, such as Frey and Osborne
(2017), overestimate automation potentials.
A related study by Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) also applies a job-level approach by
using the PIAAC. In contrast to the Arntz et al. (2016, 2017) studies, they have access to 440
detailed ISCO occupations. Whe as Arntz et al. (2016, 2017) rely on the estimated automation
potentials of all 702 occupations, they only use the expert evaluations of the 70 hand-labelled
occupations from the workshop and link them to selective task variables in the PIAAC. Their
methodology thus is closer to Frey and Osborne (2017). Nevertheless, using job-level information
on the tasks conducted, they find 10% of U.S. workers to be in the “high-risk” group – as
compared to the 47% by Frey and Osborne (2017). Pouliakas (2018) adopts a very similar
approach, but instead uses another data set, the European Skills and Jobs Survey (ESJS), and
finds that 14% of workers in the European Union work in automatable jobs. Hence, these studies
confirm that differences between the results by Arntz et al. (2016, 2017) and Frey and Osborne
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(2017) are not due to methodology or data, but are explained by the fact that occupation-level
approaches severely overestimate automation potentials.
Other studies adopt different methodologies to estimate the share of automatable jobs.
For example Dengler and Matthes (2018) hand-classify 8.000 different tasks from the German
BERUFENET database, an occupation-level database similar to O*NET, as either automat-
able or non-automatable. They then calculate the share of automatable tasks for 4.000 different
occupations and find that 15% of all workers in Germany are in the “high-risk” group, a finding
that is quite comparable to the 12% for Germany by Arntz et al. (2016). A potential explana-
tion for the similar finding is that they use such a disaggregated level of occupations that the
corresponding occupational descriptions come close to describing the actual job-level. Another
study by Arnold et al. (2016) conducts a survey among German employees, focusing on workers’
subjective beliefs about their jobs’ automation potential. According to their results, 13% of all
respondents consider it likely or very likely that their job will be replaced by new technologies
in the next 10 years.
Overall, there now exists widespread evidence that occupation-level studies overestimate
automation potentials. Taking into account job-level variation of tasks within occupations, the
share of automatable jobs drops to about 9% for the U.S. and to comparable figures in other
countries. Nevertheless, the insights that can be drawn from such estimates remain limited, as
the estimated automation potentials only capture whether a job – given its contemporaneous
task structure – could theoretically be done by a machine or not. They remain silent about
actual job losses or employment effects in the next two decades.
3 Automation and Employment
There are three main reasons why the previously discussed automation potentials must not be
equated with actual or expected job losses or employment effects, see also Arntz et al. (2016)
for a discussion:
1. Technological diffusion, i.e. the gap between technological potential and its actual imple-
mentation.
2. Worker flexibility, i.e. the ability of workers and jobs to adjust their tasks to new require-
ments.
3. Induced job creation, i.e. the job creation that technological change induces via several
mechanisms.
Taking all three aspects together, the actual net employment effect of new technologies may
surface with a time lag and may even be positive rather than negative. This section discusses
all three aspects in more detail.
3.1 Technological Diffusion
In 1987, Solow famously wrote that “[you] can see the computer age everywhere but in the
productivity statistics” (Solow, 1987). This quote became famous as the “Solow Paradox”.
According to Brynjolfsson et al. (2019), we currently experience a comparable paradox with
Artificial Intelligence (AI). AI systems rapidly advance and already surpass humans in selected
tasks, but productivity slows down rather than rises. While different explanations can be
put forward, they argue that large lags in AI implementation are the main contributor to the
paradox. So far, AI adoption severely lags behind its technological capabilities. In particular,
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Brynjolfsson et al. (2019) explain the slow diffusion of AI by arguing that AI is a General
Purpose Technology (GPT). GPTs are technologies which are pervasive (i.e. they spread to
most sectors), they improve over time, and they enhance the possibilities to further invent and
produce new products and processes, such as for example electricity or information technology
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005).
GPT often require a long time to diffuse in the wider economy. For example, computers
took 25 years to reach their long-run plateau of 5% of nonresidential equipment capital. About
half of U.S. manufacturing plants remained non-electrified 30 years after the introduction of
the polyphase system. These GPTs achieved widespread productivity gains and adoption only
once sufficient complementary innovations and investments were made (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2019). The rather low speed of diffusion is evident also for the latest technological advances.
For instance, in the recent IAB-ZEW Labour Market 4.0 (LM4.0) firm survey, Arntz et al.
(2019a) collected information on the level of technology underlying the capital stock that is
used in German firms. In particular, they distinguish between manually controlled technologies
that correspond to technologies that are either functioning mechanically or electrically, but are
not IT supported, i.e. “1.0/2.0-technologies”, technologies that are supported by computers
and software algorithms, i.e. “3.0-technologies”, and “4.0-technologies” that correspond to
technologies that are IT-integrated, i.e. they allow for a direct and automated communication
between different parts of the value chain such that workers only need to intervene in case of
failures. In manufacturing, a production based on these highly automated, digital technologies
is often referred to as “Industry 4.0”, echoing the fact that the underlying technological advances
have been considered to constitute a new, fourth industrial revolution.
Figure 5 shows the technological structure of the capital stock used in German firms in 2016
at the time of the survey, the retrospective structure as of 2011, and the firms’ expected structure
as of 2021, differentiated by production as well as office and communication equipment. For
both types of the capital stock, the shares of capital based on 4.0-technologies roughly double in
the ten year period. However, its share still remains small and, in fact, many firms are upgrading
from 1.0/2.0 to 3.0 technologies rather than introducing the latest technologies. Thus, despite
an ongoing diffusion of 4.0-technologies at a notable speed, the capital stock will continue to
be dominated by older technologies in the near future. Or, in the words of Brynjolfsson et al.
(2019, p. 10), “it takes time to build the stock of the new technology to a size sufficient enough
to have an aggregate effect”.
Several reasons can be put forward to why the speed of diffusion may actually be lower than
often expected. First of all, automation technologies will only be adopted if they can execute
a particular task at lower costs than a worker. This is highlighted in the seminal framework
on automation and jobs by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018d). This framework highlights that
what matters for the labor market is not how much could theoretically be automated, but
how much of these technological capabilities are actually profitable to be adopted. Hence,
the speed of diffusion also hinges on the costs of labor and thus on wage setting institutions
such as minimum wages or the role of collective wage bargaining. While low labor costs at
the lower end of the distribution may thus shield workers from being automated by machines
to some extent, more expensive workers in the middle of the wage distribution may be more
profitable to automate. At the same time, it is not clear when machines will actually have
a comparative advantage to perform the more complex tasks at the upper end of the wage
distribution. This will, of course, also depend on how much the wage level decreases in response
to an automation-induced decline in labor demand, as the decline in wages improves worker’s
employment prospects again. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b) for example model the effects of
automation when workers have different skills. For this reason, technological capabilities do not
necessarily translate into technological obsolescence of human labor (Acemoglu and Restrepo,
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2018d).
The costs of implementing new technologies are not limited to the acquisition of these
technologies. Instead, additional investments often are necessary to fully utilize the new tech-
nologies and make them profitable. This is particularly true for major innovations such as
GPT. Complementary investments comprise, for example, necessary organizational restructur-
ing or the acquisition of the right skills via further training and new hires (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2019). Firms go through a process of organizational redesign and substantially change their
service and product mix to raise service quality and gain efficiency (Bresnahan et al., 2002).
In fact, the shortage of qualified personnel that is able to handle new t chnologies may slow
down its implementation, as the introduction of new technol gies likely requir s the availability
of complementary skills (Acemoglu, 1998). In line ith t is, firms from the German LM4.0
survey, consider lack of qualified personnel to be a major risk for the implementation of n w
technologies. Moreover, the 65% of German firms which did not invest in 4.0-technologies be-
tween 2011 and 2016 particularly stress such risks and downplay the chances compared to firms
which already use these technologies (Arntz et al., 2018). The barriers to the implementation
of new technologies thus seem to be severe for a large share of firms, notably the smaller, less
knowledge-intensive firms.
Apart from business-related reasons, there may also be ethical or legal obstacles that slow
down or limit the speed of technological adoption. As a prominent example that has been
discussed by Thierer and Hagemann (2015) and Bonnefon et al. (2016), the autonomous car
bears new legal challenges regarding, for instance, the liability in case of an accident. More-
over, ethical questions emerge whenever an autonomous car cannot prevent an accident and
an algorithm has to decide, for example, between crashing into a car or a truck. While some
of these obstacles may be resolved at some point, they clearly slow down the pace with which
technologies are introduced.
A final aspect that should be considered is that society may have strong preferences for the
provision of certain tasks and services by humans as opposed to machines. As an example,
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nursing or caring for the elderly may remain labor-intensive sectors, even if service robots
increasingly complement these professions in the future. Hence, “some human services will
probably continue to command a premium compared to robotically produced one” (Pratt, 2015,
p. 58), meaning that there is a societal value attached to humans performing certain tasks that
tends to preserve their comparative advantage.
3.2 Flexibility of Workers
Jobs are bundles of tasks, not all of which can be automated. Just because a certain fraction of a
job’s tasks can be automated, the job need not be automated as a whole (see e.g. Brynjolfsson
and Mitchell, 2017, Autor, 2015). For example, Arntz et al. (2017) argue that workers in
seemingly automatable occupations apparently specialize in non-automatable niches within their
profession. Most jobs are unlikely to be sufficiently well defined to be fully substitutable by
machines. In line with this, Pratt (2015, p. 52) states for the advances in robotics that
“specialized robots will improve at performing well-defined tasks, but in the real world, there are
far more problems yet to be solved than ways presently known to solve them”.
Therefore, when firms introduce new production technologies, the initial impact of those
machines on employment depends on whether workers are able to adjust to the new demands.
In particular, the new technologies typically substitute for certain tasks and complement others.
Whether automation technologies replace workers in a given job thus hinges on workers’ ability
to exchange tasks that are replaceable by machines for new tasks that complement machines.
For example, Automated Teller Machines (ATM) directly took over the tasks that bank tellers
previously did in banks. Nevertheless, with the rapid increase in the number of ATMs, the
number of bank tellers raised instead of declined. While ATMs replaced bank tellers in some
tasks, bank tellers became more valuable in their remaining tasks, such as handling small
business customers (Bessen, 2015).
Several studies suggest that this adjustment mechanism may actually be quite effective. For
instance, although there has been a decline in jobs with predominantly routine and automatable
tasks, the reduction of routine and automatable tasks in the economy mainly takes place by
adjusting the set of tasks within occupations (e.g. Autor et al., 2003, Spitz-Oener, 2006).
Workers seem to shift worktime from routine and automatable tasks to tasks that complement
machines. The computerization for example has been associated with a strong decline in routine
tasks. Spitz-Oener (2006) finds that less than 1% of the decline in cognitive routine tasks
between 1979 and 1999 in Germany occurred between occupations, i.e. due to declining shares
of cognitive-routine intensive occupation. Instead, almost all of the decline took place within
occupations – i.e. workers in cognitive-routine intense occupations switching from cognitive-
routine tasks to other tasks. More broadly, she finds the vast majority of task changes to take
place within rather than between occupations.
Typically, the adoption of new technologies comes along with a new division of labor where
workers increasingly perform tasks that complement machines (Autor, 2015), some of which
may actually be newly created tasks (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018d). The tasks done by long-
established occupations such as secretaries, for instance, clearly changed dramatically across
time as skill demands changed with the introduction of new machines (e.g. typewriter, personal
computer, workflow systems).
The adoption of new technologies is likely to differently affect workers depending on their
abilities. Janssen and Mohrenweiser (2018), for example, investigate the introduction of the new
computer-based control system (Computerized Numerical Control, CNC) in the field of cutting
machine operation into the German apprenticeship regulation. The subsequent adoption of
this technology likely was harmful for workers who graduated just before the change of the
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curriculum. However, Janssen and Mohrenweiser (2018) find that only those workers who were
forced to switch their occupations experienced negative labor market effects, suggesting that
those who remained employed in the occupation learned to handle the technology on the job,
shielding themselves from potential negative consequences. Cortes (2016) found that workers
in routine occupations, who were exposed to computerization, experienced a wage increase of
14-16% over 10 years if they were able to switch to higher-paid cognitive jobs compared to those
who stayed. These, however, potentially were the high-ability workers. Hence, workers’ fate in
phases of technological turmoil depends on workers’ ability to learn the skills required in their
new work environment, or on their ability to upgrade their occupation.
Overall, new technologies are unlikely to fully automate workplaces or occupations on a large
scale, but rather change workplaces and the tasks involved in certain occupations. As long as
workers are able to adjust to these new task demands, machines need not crowd out workers.
However, if the tasks that complement machines become increasingly complex and demanding,
the employment prospects for workers lacking certain skills may deteriorate.
3.3 Compensatory Mechanisms
Despite the just described adjustment of tasks at the level of workers and individual workplaces,
the introduction of automation technologies to some extent replaces workers who were previ-
ously employed to perform the automated tasks. Whether this leads to an overall increase or
decline of employment, is ambiguous, as several compensating mechanisms counteract the initial
displacement effect. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018d,c) develop a framework to analyze under
which conditions the displacement effect of automation exceeds its compensating mechanisms.
In particular, automation induces the following effects:
• Productivity effect. This effect captures the fact that technological innovations make
firms more productive, reducing costs and prices which raises demand and production.
In addition, automation may raise quality or enable new types of products or services,
increasing demand and production. Moreover, the economy expands, raising the demand
for labor also in sectors that do not adopt new technologies due to a multiplier effect.
• Reinstatement effect. This effect evolves either because these new tasks are complementary
to the new technologies or because the displacement effect increases the amount of labor
that is available to perform new, more productive tasks. More workers are required to
perform the new tasks, raising demand for labor.
The net effect of automation on employment is ambiguous and ultimately remains an empir-
ical question. There exists a huge empirical literature that analyzes the aggregate employment
effects of new technologies and innovations, as for example surveyed by Feldmann (2013), Pianta
(2009) or Vivarelli (2007). However, this chapter focuses on technologies that aim at substituting
for workers via automation. This chapter solely discusses the empirical literature that explicitly
addresses automation technologies, and particularly focuses on more recent technologies.
Studies on the employment effect of automation technologies can be roughly categorized
into firm-, sector- and regional-level studies. Firm-level studies analyze how the adoption of
automation technologies affects employment in the firms that invest in them. Cortes and Sal-
vatori (2018), for example, do not find a decline of routine occupations in firms which invested
in new technologies, contrary to what one would expect given that computerization potentially
substitutes for routine tasks. Instead, they find that most of the decline in routine occupations
is linked to declining shares of firms with initially larger shares of routine occupations. Similarly,
in ongoing work Arntz et al. (2019a) show that firms’ technology investments did not reduce
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their net employment, because displacement effects are offset by technology-induced firm-growth
in Germany. While the net effects at the firm level thus seem to be small, Bessen et al. (2019)
show that automation in firms raises the separation rates of their workers, reducing their days in
employment and wage income over the next five years. While firm-level studies are informative
about the processes taking place within the firms, they remain rather silent about adjustment
processes that occur between firms. In particular, if firms automate, they potentially become
more competitive and crowd out firms that do not automate. The firm-level results therefore
cannot be transferred to aggregate employment effects, as potential positive employment effects
in automating firms could be offset by employment losses in competing firms.
Sector-level studies take into account this reallocation of workers between less and more
innovative firms. A recent study by Graetz and Michaels (2018) for 17 OECD countries for
example shows that the additional use of robots between 1993 and 2007 raised both labor
productivity and value added at the sectoral level by about 0.36 and 0.37 percentage points,
respectively, as suggested by the productivity effect. At the same time, they find no significant
effects on total hours worked, although they report negative effects for low-skilled workers. Sim-
ilar to firm-level studies, sector-level studies are only suggestive for the aggregate employment
effects as they typically do not take into account the technology-induced reallocation between
innovative- and non-innovative sectors.
Other studies rely on regions as small economies to study economy-wide effects of technolog-
ical change. Dauth et al. (2017) find net neutral effects of robots in German local labor markets
between 1994 and 2014. This is accompanied by a loss of about 2.12 jobs in manufacturing per
additional robot, which is fully compensated by rising service employment. Hence, local labor
markets with a higher exposure to robots did not experience net employment losses. Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2017), to the contrary, document negative overall effects of robots in US local la-
bor markets between 1993 and 2007. According to them, an additional robot per 1,000 workers
reduces the employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and thus has only limited
effects on the US labor market.
Hence, productivity and reinstatement effects of robots apparently are strong enough to
compensate their displacement effects in Germany, but are somewhat weaker in the US. There
exist several potential reasons for this divergence. In Germany, labor protection legislation is
stricter than in the US, meaning that it is more costly for German firms to lay off workers,
raising firms’ incentives to train workers to take over new tasks, rather than laying them off.
In addition, the strong vocational education in Germany likely ensures that workers are higher
skilled and better able to take over new tasks, compared to US workers. Finally, the higher
formal education of the German workers exposed to robots in manufacturing likely implies that
they might rank higher in the German wage distribution than comparable workers in the US
wage distribution. In this case, the productivity gains from automation via robots are higher
in Germany than in the US, such that the compensating mechanisms might be stronger in
Germany compared to the US.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) highlight that employment effects of robots seem to strongly
differ from that of computerization more broadly. Gregory et al. (2018) instead study the
employment effects of computerization. In contrast to the other two studies, they adopt a
structural approach, by which they are able to explicitly disentangle the job destruction effects
of computerization from the compensating mechanisms. They find that computerization in-
deed had strong displacement effects, reducing employment by 1.64 million jobs between 1999
and 2010 in the European Union. However, computerization created more additional jobs via
induced productivity effects, resulting in a net employment increase of 1.79 million jobs (see
Figure 6). Other results by Autor and Dorn (2013) indicate no net negative employment effects
of computerization in the US. Differences in the effects of computerization in the European
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Figure 6: Employment Effects of Computerization in the European Union, 1999-2010 
Evidence from recent automation phases thus suggests that there have been no negative employment 
effect of computerization in the US and even positive effects in the European Union. Robots instead, a 
technology that is more focused on replacing human tasks, do not, on net, destroy jobs in Germany, 
while they do reduce employment in the US, although to a limited extend only. According to this, 
previous automation technologies indeed did displace many workers, but had no or only limited 
negative employment effects due to large compensating mechanisms. Obviously, past phases of 
technological change so far did not lead to mass unemployment due to countervailing effects (Autor 
2015). It is therefore misleading to simply focus on automation potentials when one aims to 
understand how automation technologies affect the labor market. 
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Unio and in the US might result from the sa e re ons, as with robots above.
Evidence from recent automation phases thus suggests that there have been no negative em-
ployment effect of computerization in the US and even positive effects in the European Union.
Robots instead, a technology that is more focused on replacing human tasks, do not, on net,
destroy jobs in Germany, while they do reduce employment in the US, although to a limited
extend only. According to this, previous automation technologies indeed did displace many
workers, but had no or only limited negative employment effects due to large compensating
mechanisms. Obviously, past phases of technological change so far did not lead to mass unem-
ployment due to countervailing effects (Autor, 2015). It is therefore misleading to simply focus
on automation potentials when one aims to understand how automation technologies affect the
labor market.
4 Scenarios for Employment Effects
The previous sections highlight that automation potentials are not informative about the impact
of automation on the labor market, as they ignore slow and incomplete technology adoption,
worker level adjustment, and job creation effects. Several recent studies overcome these prob-
lems by directly studying the link between past automation and its employment effects. How-
ever, these studies focus on past automation technologies and do not capture the more recent
technological innovations in the field of artificial intelligence. To overcome this shortcoming,
Arntz et al. (2018) exploit a more recent period of technological upgrading in the German labor
market (2011-2016) in order to simulate scenarios for the next few years (2016-2021) regarding
the effects so called 4.0 technologies on employment and its various compensation mechanisms.
In contrast to previous studies, they are able to take into account cutting-edge automation
technologies. This section, first outlines the methodology, before presenting the results for the
baseline and alternative scenarios and deriving implications.
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4.1 Methodology
The basic idea of the methodology by Arntz et al. (2018) is to first estimate how technology
investments have affected employment in the investing firms and the wider economy and to
then study the likely consequences of more investments into cutting-edge technologies in the
future. To do this, they first develop a task-based framework which captures mechanisms that
are similar to mechanisms in the framework by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018d) and empirically
estimate its parameters (see Arntz et al., 2019b for details). In particular, their model covers
the following mechanisms:
1. Substitution and complementarity: Technologies both substitute for some workers while
complementing others. They substitute for workers, as the automation technologies re-
place workers in tasks they previously performed (displacement effect). They simultane-
ously complement other workers, since they require more input of other types of workers
who do tasks complementary to the machines. These could be, for example, new tasks,
in which case this effect is similar to the reinstatement effect, above. Given a certain
output level, firms’ investments thus reduce demand for the former workers, while raising
demand for the latter. Arntz et al. (2018) estimate the net effect of substitution and
complementarity.
2. Product demand: (a) Technology investments affect firms’ competitiveness, which reduces
prices and increases output, thereby raising labor demand and employment. (b) In ad-
dition, technological capital has to be produced, which implies that any change in firms’
investment decisions affects employment via capital production. (c) Finally, the expanding
technological frontier implies that the economy can produce more as a whole and becomes
richer, which raises consumption, production, and employment. These effects are similar
to the productivity effect, discussed above.
3. Labor supply: Changes in the demand for labor affect unemployment which induces wage
responses. Both, in turn, trigger worker mobility from declining labor market segments to
growing labor market segments. The resulting effects are ambiguous: On the one hand,
occupations and industries with declining demand will experience falling wages, thereby
reducing the cost incentives for automation and thus limiting the employment conse-
quences. At the same time, workers will try to leave these segments, which reduces the
increase in the segments’ unemployment rate, hence limiting the described wage response.
Labor supply responses may thus either limit or amplify the employment consequences of
technology-induced labor demand shocks.
Arntz et al. (2019b) estimate the parameters of this model using the previously mentioned
novel LM4.0 firm survey, employment data from social security records, international trade
data, and official statistics. That is, they exploit the fact that the LM4.0 survey covers firms
that already invested in cutting-edge technologies between 2011 and 2016 in order to study how
the economy and the labor market respond to the adoption of new technologies. Arntz et al.
(2018) then feed this model with firms’ investment plans for the next five years to study how
these investment plans are likely to affect the German labor market until 2021.
4.2 Baseline Scenario
This section discusses the likely consequences of firms’ investment plans for employment and
wages in Germany in the next five years. The model allows to empirically disentangle three
mechanisms by which firms’ technology investments affect employment, as outlined above. Fig-
ure 7 presents the main results from the baseline simulation. Overall, firms’ future plans for
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4.2 Baseline Scenario 
This section discusses the likely consequences of firms’ investment plans for employment and wages 
in Germany in the next five years. The model allows to empirically disentangle three mechanisms by 
which firms’ technology investments affect employment, as outlined above. Figure 7 presents the main 
results from the baseline simulation. Overall, firms’ future plans for technology investments are 
expected to increase employment by 1.8 % over five years. Thus, contrary to public fears, new 
technologies might actually raise rather than reduce employment.  
Figure 7 plots the effects of firms’ investments into all technology types on employment via the 
different mechanisms. That is the calculations take into account investments into all technology types, 
both recent and older technologies, and at first do not disentangle the effects by the different 
generations of technologies. Intuitively, one would expect the substitution effect to dominate the 
complementarity effect when automation technologies are introduced. Quite unexpectedly,  the 
opposite holds true. The introduction of the new technologies seems to require more additional labor 
input in complementary occupations than it can substitute in replaceable occupations. The new 
technologies require more rather than less workers. The overall net positive employment effect 
therefore does not stem from positive product demand effects but rather from the fact that new 
technologies seem to be complementary rather than substitutable to work. Quite the opposite, the 
product demand effect is actually negative indicating that firms cannot gain from lower costs and 
demand expansions. This suggests that firms currently invest in the adoption of the new technologies 
which requires more workers than can be replaced by machines and where high investment costs at 
least temporarily imply that firms cannot gain from lower costs and demand expansions. However, a 
positive effect on employment remains, which puts upward pressure on wages. The resulting wage 
increase limits the employment expansion – this is reflected in a negative contribution of the labor 
supply effect to overall employment. 
Figure 7: Employment Effects 
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Figure 7: Employment Effects
technology investments are expected to increase employment by 1.8% over five years. Thus,
contrary to public fears, new technologies might actually raise rather than reduce employment.
Figure 7 plots the effects of firms’ investments into all technology types on employment
via the different mechanisms. That is the calculations take into account investments into all
technology types, both recent and older technologies, and at first do not disentangle the effects
by the different generations of technologies. Intuitively, one would expect the substitution effect
to dominate the complementarity effect when automation technologies are introduced. Quite
unexpectedly, the opposite holds true. The introduction of the new technologies seems to require
more additional labor input in complementary occupations than it can substitute in replaceable
occupations. The new technologies require more rather than less workers. The overall net
positive employment effect therefore does not stem from positive product demand effects but
rather from the fact that new technologies seem to be complementary rather than substitutable
to work. Quite the opposite, the product demand effect is actually negative indicating that
firms cannot gain from lower costs and demand expansions. This suggests that firms currently
invest in the adoption of the new technologies which requires more workers than can be replaced
by machines and where high investment costs at least temporarily imply that firms cannot gain
from lower costs and demand expansions. However, a positive effect on employment remains,
which puts upward pressure on wages. The resulting wage increase limits the employment
expansion – this is reflected in a negative contribution of the labor supply effect to overall
employment.
Next, Figure 8 differentiates by type of technology in order to disentangle how these types
differently affect workers. The types of technologies are explained in Section 3.1. The pattern
for older, more mature technologies strikingly differ from cutting edge 4.0-technologies. While
for technologies up to technology-level 3.0 substitution effects dominate complementary effects,
the opposite is true for 4.0-technologies. Investments in older technologies initially replace
more workers than they require, but induce positive product demand effects as firms get more
productive. This limits negative net employment effects. In contrast, the complementarity
effects of most recent technologies clearly dominate their substitution potential and induce
negative rather than positive product demand effects. This suggests that firms currently hire
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widespread beliefs, it is currently not the investments in the newest technologies that substitute for 
workers, but rather investments in older technologies that are less likely to go along with the creation 
of new tasks. Moreover, these findings support the view that the productivity puzzle, i.e. the stagnant 
labor productivity despite high investments in new technologies, may actually reflect that we are 
experiencing an investment period whose returns also in terms of rising labor productivity likely still 
need time to unfold. While the results from this section support this explanation for the productivity 
puzzle, they do not rule out competing explanations. Others, for example, argue that these 
technologies actually do not have large productivity effects (e.g. Gordon 2014, 2015), that innovation 
and technological progress are slowing down (e.g. Cowen 2011, Bloom et al. 2017), that the focus of 
technological change has shifted towards automation that has little productivity effects (e.g. 
Acemoglu/Restrepo 2018d), or that measurement errors prevent observing the productivity effects 
(e.g. Mokyr 2014). 
Figure 8: Employment Effects by Technology Type 
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workers to adopt these technologies without being able to substitute for lots of workers, so far.
Therefore, firms which invest into these technologies cannot yet achieve large efficiency gains,
such that they lose competitive advantages in the short run, resulting in lower output and less
employment. Yet, the net effect on employment of the newest technologies remains positive.
These patterns observed for 4.0 technologies match the description of Brynjolfsson et al.
(2019) of such technologies being a GPT that first requires complementary investments before
unfolding its productivity potentials in the longer run (see Section 3.1). This would also suggest
that the employment effects of 4.0 technologies are likely to change once they start to mature.
Hence, to the contrary of widespread beliefs, it is currently not the investments in the newest
technologies that substitute for workers, but rather investments in older technologies that are
less likely to go along with the creation of new tasks. Moreover, these findings support the
view that the productivity puzzle, i.e. the stagnant labor productivity despite high investments
in new technologies, may actually reflect that we are experiencing an investment period whose
returns also in terms of rising labor productivity likely still need time to unfold. While the
results from this section support this explanation for the productivity puzzle, they do not rule
out competing explanations. Others, for example, argue that these technologies actually do
not have large productivity effects (e.g. Gordon, 2014, 2015), that innovation and technological
progress are slowing down (e.g. Cowen, 2011; Bloom et al., 2017), that the focus of technological
change has shifted towards automation that has little productivity effects (e.g. Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2018a), or that measurement errors prevent observing the productivity effects (e.g.
Mokyr, 2014).
Despite the fact that the model predicts no net employment losses of technology invest-
ments, it does predict strong structural changes on the labor market such as a reallocation of
employment across occupations and sectors. To demonstrate this, Figure 9 reports the joint
employment effects of investments in all types of technology by type of occupation. As expected,
the effects are particularly positive for workers in occupations with a focus on analytical and
interactive tasks. These are tasks that are unlikely to be substituted by new technologies, but
which instead are complementary to these. The picture is very different for workers in occu-
pations that demand high shares of cognitive routine-tasks. These tasks are most exposed to
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investments in all types of technology by type of occupation. As expected, the effects are particularly 
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that are unlikely to be substituted by new technologies, but which instead are complementary to 
these. The picture is very different for workers in occupations that demand high shares of cognitive 
routine-tasks. These tasks are most exposed to automation via new technologies and also unlikely to 
benefit from newly created tasks. As a consequence, workers focusing on such tasks suffer from 
technological change. Interestingly, the effects on mainly manual occupations is rather small, 
emphasizing that current technological advances mainly affect cognitive tasks. 
Figure 9: Employment Effects by Occupation 
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market. There are in total 60 labor market segments, resulting from 5 occupational groups and 12 
industry aggregates. Cells with high initial average daily wages benefit most from technology 
investments and expand, whereas low- and particularly medium-payed occupations and industries 
face stagnating or even declining employment. Firms’ planned technology investments thus are 
expected to induce rising inequality and a (weak) employment polarization. 
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automation via new technologies and also unlikely to benefit from newly created tasks. As a
consequence, workers focusing on such tasks suffer from technological change. Interestingly, the
effects on mainly manual occupations is rather small, emphasizing that current technological
advances mainly affect cognitive tasks.
Figure 10 plots the employment effects by the initial average daily wage for each segment of
the labor market. There are in total 60 labor market segments, resulting from 5 occupational
groups and 12 industry aggregates. Cells with high initial average daily wages benefit most
from technology investments and expand, whereas low- and particularly medium-payed occupa-
tions and industries face stagnating or even declining employment. Firms’ planned technology
investments thus are expected to induce rising inequality and a (weak) employment polarization.
4.3 Moderating Factors
In order to study how wage setting frictions and workers’ mobility moderate the effect of tech-
nological change on the labor market, Arntz et al. (2018) develop two scenarios. In the mobility
scenario, they simulate employment and wage responses to technological change assuming the
mobility elasticity to be twice as high as in the baseline model. In the rigid wages scenario, they
conduct a similar analysis assuming the wage elasticity to be half as large as in the baseline
model.
The main employment effects of these additional scenarios can be depicted from Figure 11.
Obviously, when solely changing elasticities which enter the labor supply part of the framework
while leaving labor and product demand unchanged, only the labor supply effect changes. In
the mobility scenario, hardly any change in the labor supply effect is visible. This is due to
the fact that the size of the overall workforce is fixed in the model. Workers now move faster
between labor market segments thus changing the allocation of workers across occupations and
sectors, but this hardly affects the overall net labor supply effect. In the rigid wages scenario, the
negative labor supply effect is smaller instead. As wages are rigid, they do not rise as fast in the
expanding labor market segments, such that the expansion of employment in these segments is
less limited by wage increases. Overall, rigid wages amplify any effects that technologies have on
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As wages are rigid, they do not rise as fast in the expanding labor market segments, such that the 
expansion of employment in these segments is less limited by wage increases. Overall, rigid wages 
amplify any effects that technologies have on employment. In the present case, rigid wages thus results 
in larger positive effects of technology on net employment, since a smaller part of the net positive 
labor demand shock accrues to wages, and a larger part accrues to employment. 
Figure 12: Wage Effects by Occupation for Different Scenarios 
The flipside of rigid wages thus is slower wage growth compared to the baseline scenario, as outlined 
in Figure 12. This holds across all occupations. Nevertheless, the fast expanding analytical and 
interactive occupations still face higher wage growth. In the mobility scenario, differences in wage 
growth between occupations are less pronounced. This is due to the fact that workers are more mobile 
between occupations and switch faster to the expanding occupations, thereby limiting wage growth 
in these occupations. Simultaneously, labor supply becomes scarcer in the declining occupations, 
raising wages in these occupations compared to the baseline scenario. Hence, the higher worker 
mobility rates not only help the mobile workers to achieve higher wages in other occupations, but they 
also benefit those workers who remain in the declining occupations by reducing the competition 
between them. Thus, even if higher mobility of workers has hardly any effect on overall employment, 
it helps a larger share of workers to reap the benefits of technological change and, hence, also reduces 
wage and employment inequality and polarization. 
4.4 Implications 
The results from these simulations provide five key results for the likely effects of automation and 
digitalization on the German labor market in the next five years:  
(1) Firms’ plans to invest in automation and digitalization technologies likely have small positive effects
on employment in Germany. In the baseline scenario, these investments raise overall employment by
1.8 % in 5 years. Mass technological unemployment thus remains unlikely, a finding that is in line with
the impact of technological change in earlier decades (see Section 3.3). However, these net positive
employment effects do not imply an absence of job losses. In the scenarios, automation does destroy
jobs in specific occupations and industries, as automation technologies replace workers. However,
these negative effects are more than compensated by job creation effects of automation, resulting in
overall net positive employment effects.
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Figure 12: Wage Effects for Different Scenarios
employment. In the present case, rigid wages thus results in larger positive effects of technology
on net employment, since a smaller part of the net positive labor demand shock accrues to
wages, and a larger part accrues to employment.
The flip-side of rigid wages thus is slower wage growth compared to the baseline scenario,
as outlined in Figure 12. This holds across all occupations. Nevertheless, the fast expanding
analytical and interactive occupations still face higher wage growth. In the mobility scenario,
differences in wage growth between occupations are less pronounced. This is due to the fact that
workers are more mobile between occupations and switch faster to the expanding occupations,
th reby limiting wag growth in these occupations. Simultaneously, labor supply becomes
scarcer in the declining occupations, raising wages in these ccup tions compared to the baselin
scenario. Hence, the h gher worker m bil ty rates not only help the mobile workers to achieve
higher wages in other occupations, but they also benefit those workers who remain in the
declining occupations by reducing competition between them. Thus, even if higher mobility of
worker has hardly any effect on overall mployment, it helps a larger share of workers o re p
the benefits of technological change and, hence, also reduces wage and employment inequality
and polarization.
4.4 Implications
T results from these simulations provide five k y results for the likely ff cts of automation
and digitalization on the German la or market in the next five years:
(1) Firms’ plans to i vest in a tomation and dig talization technologies likely have small
positive effects on employment in Ger any. In the baseline sc nario, these investments raise
overall employment by 1.8% in 5 years. Mass technological unemployment thus remains unlikely,
a finding that is in line with the impact of technological change in earlier decades (see Section
3.3). However, these net positive employment effects do not imply an absence of job losses. In
the scenarios, automation does destroy jobs in specific occupations and industries, as automation
technologies replace workers. However, these negative effects are more than compensated by
job creation effects of automation, resulting in overall net positive employment effects.
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(2) The small net positive employment effects are accompanied by large structural shifts
between occupations and industries in the 5-year scenario. Hence, the key challenge of automa-
tion and digitalization does not relate to the number of jobs, but to the job structure. In line
with much of the literature, cognitive routine jobs continue to decline, as they are replaced by
machines. Jobs with high shares of abstract or interactive tasks, on the other hand, are on the
rise, as these are typically complementary to the new technologies. Workers who are able to
switch to these jobs therefore are likely to gain from the adoption of new technologies, whereas
workers who lack such skills will likely suffer from automation and digitalization.
(3) The expanding abstract and interactive task intensive occupations typically are high-
wage occupations, whereas the stagnating occupations are located in the middle and at the
lower end of the wage distribution. This implies that mostly high-skilled and well-paid workers
profit the most from digitalization, whereas middle- and lower-skilled workers fall further be-
hind. Digitalization and automation, therefore, likely raise inequality in Germany. The results
point to a continued employment polarization, as the jobs in the middle seem to grow even
slower than those at the lower tail, although rising inequality dominates. There exists a similar
pattern of weak wage polarization accompanied by markedly rising wage inequality in response
to technological change. Hence, in line with results from studies on automation potentials (see
section 2), technological change is likely to raise inequality on the German labor market in the
next five years by favoring high-skilled workers.
(4) Our simulations further highlight that rising worker mobility, e.g. via training and
further education, can help to mitigate rising inequality and to ensure that a larger fraction of
workers profits from technological change. While the simulations suggest that rising mobility
has hardly any effect on overall employment or unemployment, it is still beneficial to many
workers by either enabling them to take up better-paid jobs in expanding occupations, or by
reducing the pressure in declining occupations.
(5) Finally, the simulations strongly suggest that automation and digitalization at least
currently is a costly investment for many firms. In particular, firms that invest in cutting-edge
technologies face a rising demand for certain types of workers, while so far not being able to
replace workers on a large scale. In addition, there appears to be no or only little expansion
in the output of those firms. All this suggests that firms currently incur high investment
costs to adopt new technologies, while not being able to reap related benefits in terms of
higher productivity and lower costs, yet. Once this investment phase is completed, the new
technologies may unfold their productivity advantages. This phase may then be accompanied
by larger technology-induced job-separations, as one actually observes for investments into older,
more mature technologies. However, the related productivity gains simultaneously induce an
increasing product demand and likely result in the generation of new jobs.
These key results entail three main implications for policy makers.
Promoting new technologies: Overall, technological change contributes to employment
growth. In the case of investments in “3.0 technologies”, this is mainly the case due to the
strongly positive productivity effects, whereas cutting-edge “4.0 technologies” currently seem
to complement rather than replace workers due to their investment character. Corresponding
investments thus require significantly more skilled workers for the implementation of these tech-
nologies. An accelerated diffusion of both 3.0 and 4.0 technologies into companies therefore may
be a desirable goal as, on net, both technologies raise employment. Policy measures to support
the adoption of new technologies (e.g. broadband expansion, data protection laws) could thus
help to increase related gains. In particular, the results based on the LM4.0 Survey indicate
that the technological latecomers seem to lack information to better assess the opportunities and
risks related to these technologies. Targeted information campaigns, e.g. at the level of industry
associations and regionally organized networks, may help to reduce information deficits.
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Addressing shortages of skilled workers: In the medium term, new digital technolo-
gies are strongly complementary to analytical and interactive activities. The growth potential
resulting from the new technologies thus depends strongly on the availability of suitably skilled
workers. Here, appropriate educational policies help to ensure that the skills in demand are
trained both in schools and in the area of vocational and university education. In addition, the
number of skilled workers may also be increased by further training measures. However, which
measures are most likely to ease occupational transitions can hardly be derived at the aggregate
level, but requires further analysis at the individual level.
Increasing mobility: The results on labor supply show that mobility between labor seg-
ments is currently relatively high and that increased labor mobility has little impact on the net
employment effects. However, increased mobility between shrinking and growing labor market
segments contributes to counteracting employment and wage inequality. Accelerated mobility
from shrinking segments to growing segments leads to an alignment of employment opportu-
nities and wage developments in the segments. Training and qualification measures thus seem
natural recommendations to raise mobility. Nevertheless, in order to make more targeted rec-
ommendations on how mobility between different occupations and sectors can be increased,
further analysis at the individual level are needed, to analyze, for example, the influence of
further training and qualification measures.
5 Conclusions
The past decades have been characterized by a tremendous rise in computing power, reducing
the costs of automating so-called routine tasks which follow clear, explicit rules and can thus be
put into computer code. This has led to a polarization of labor markets in advanced economies
with declining shares of middle-paid, routine-intensive occupations and rising shares of both,
high- and low-paid jobs.
While this computerization has not led to employment declines, the question whether this
holds true for the effects of further technological advances in the near future remains open.
Whereas previous automation methods were limited to problems that are sufficiently well un-
derstood to be put into algorithms of well-defined steps, now even less structured problems
appear automatable using big data and machine learning. Continued increases in comput-
ing power, the growing availability of big data, and significant advances in Machine Learning
methods are shifting the boundaries of what can be automated by machines. Against this back-
ground, some studies predict that about half of the U.S. workforce is “at risk of automation”,
which has spurred public fears of technology-induced mass unemployment.
This chapter contrastes such fears with the scientific debate. The first main contribution is
to show that many estimates of automation potentials are severely upward biased, as they often
are conducted at the occupational level, ignoring the huge heterogeneity of what people actually
do at work. As many workers in seemingly automatable occupations already adjust their task
schedules to non-automatable tasks, they often face much lower exposure to automation. This
chapter finds that the share of workers in automatable jobs is more in the order of 9% in the
U.S., and similarly in other countries.
These numbers, however, only refer to technological potentials and must not be equated
with actual job losses or employment effects as is often done in the public debate. The second
main contribution of this chapter is to explain why this is the case. In particular, there are
three main reasons for this: (1) The diffusion of new technologies into the economy is a rather
slow process, leaving workers time to adjust. Diffusion is slow due to high costs, uncertainty,
the need to undergo organizational change for implementing the technologies, and the need for
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acquiring workers with suitable skills. (2) Workers are flexible and adjust. In fact, much of the
adjustment to automation is not made by making seemingly replaceable occupations redundant,
but by workers doing other tasks in the same occupations. Being in an occupation that is “at
risk” thus does not necessarily imply that the worker is about to lose his or her job, but that
the worker has to adapt by switching to the right tasks and learning the right skills. (3) Finally,
while automation indeed does displace jobs, it simultaneously creates new jobs. The overall
effect on the number of jobs (employment) has been actually positive, not negative. It is thus
ambiguous, whether the wave of new automation technologies will reduce or actually raise labor
demand.
Whether the next wave of digitalization and automation thus leads to less or more jobs,
is an open question. The third contribution of this chapter is to present scenarios for the
potential impact of digitalization and automation via cutting-edge technologies on the German
labor market, exploiting a recent survey on the adoption of new digital technologies and a new
framework to estimate and simulate the effects. The results suggest that the net effect remains
small, and is actually positive in the next five years. However, there appear large structural shifts
between occupations and industries, which are accompanied by rising inequality and, weakly, by
employment polarization. The main challenge for the future thus is not mass unemployment,
but structural change. In addition, the simulations suggest that we currently experience an
investment phase, where firms first have to incur high investment costs and need to acquire the
right skilled workers, before being able to reap large productivity gains. Hence, the effects of
these cutting-edge technologies may change in the medium to long-run, when the technologies
mature. Nevertheless, this does not imply that they reduce employment in the longer run,
as, once they mature, they simultaneously create productivity effects that also raise demand
for labor. It remains to be seen whether the job-creating effects continue to dominate the
job-destruction effects in the longer run.
These results entail three main policy implications. Firstly, promoting the adoption of
new technologies seems to be a reasonable policy goal, as these technologies apparently raise
employment and production. The focus should be on medium and small firms who currently
seem to fall behind. Secondly, the introduction of these technologies requires workers with the
right skills. The lack of such workers seems to partly hinder the introduction of new technologies.
The second recommendation thus is to address skill shortages by education, qualification, and
further training. Finally, the coming wave of technological change seems to be associated with
a further rise in inequality, as high-skilled, high-wage occupations are on the rise, whereas low-
and medium paid jobs further fall behind. In order to prevent further rising inequality, targeted
training and qualification measures may help workers to switch to the expanding occupations,
thus helping them to participate in the technology-induced benefits, while lowering the losses
of those who cannot change their skills and jobs and thus remain in shrinking occupations and
sectors.
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